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Abstract
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society are result from a bargaining process between groups
of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between
legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). The purpose of this
work is to conduct a laboratory study of the eﬀect of diﬀerent voting procedures on group
decision-making in the context of ultimatum bargaining. An earlier study (Bornstein and Yaniv,
[2]) has suggested that when the bargaining game is played by unstructured groups of agents,
rather than by individuals, the division of the payoﬀ is substantially aﬀected in favor of the
ultimatum-proposers. Our theoretical arguments suggest that one explanation for this could be
implicit voting rules within groups. We propose to explicitly structure the group decision-making
as voting and study the impact of diﬀerent voting rules on the bargaining outcome.
Keywords: Bargaining games, group decision making and experimental design.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C92, D44, D82.
∗We would like to express our thanks to Gary Borstein, Vincent Crawford, David Kaplan, John Kagel, Cesar
Martinelli, Charlie Plott, Al Roth, Andrew Schotter, and Tridib Sharma for their helpful advice, Gabriela Calder´ on,
Esteban Colla, Demi´ an Reyes and Ar´ am Zamora for assitance in running the experiments, and Abelardo Le´ on for
assistance in programming. Financial support from the Ford Foundation-CIDE and Asociaci´ on Mexicana de Cultura
is also acknowledged.
†ITAM - CIE, Camino Santa Teresa 930, 10700 M´ exico DF, M´ exico. Phone: +52 55 56284197. Fax: +52 55
56284058; e-mail: elbittar@itam.mx.
‡ITAM - CIE, Camino Santa Teresa 930, 10700 M´ exico DF, M´ exico. Phone: +52 55 56284197. Fax: +52 55
56284058; e-mail: gomberg@itam.mx
§CIDE, Carretera M´ exico-Toluca 3655 Col. Lomas de Santa Fe 01210 M´ exico, D.F. Phone: +52 55 57279863;
e-mail: laura.sour@cide.edu.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many rent-sharing decisions in a society are result from a bargaining process between groups of in-
dividuals, such as the bargaining between the executive and the legislative branches of government,
between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc. In contrast,
most experimental results on bargaining involve one-on-one play between individuals.
We explore the consequences of group-on-group action in the context of ultimatum bargaining.
In this game, one side proposes how to partition a total available payoﬀ between herself and another
side, who, in turn can choose to accept or reject the proposal. In case of acceptance the proposal
is implemented, while in case of the rejection neither side receives anything. As is well-known, the
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome is for the ultimatum-proposer to receive (almost) the entire
surplus. In contrast, in laboratory implementation of the game ultimatum-responders consistently
obtain a signiﬁcant, though smaller, share.
The basic motivation is to see the extent to which the well-studied theoretical properties and
empirical regularities on bargaining established in the earlier literature can be aﬀected by introduc-
ing group decision-making, and to compare the impact of diﬀerent rules of aggregating individual
preferences into group decisions. If such impact is non-negligible, it has implications for bargaining
between groups using diﬀerent explicit voting rules to agree on intragroup decisions. This also may
shed light on implicit preference aggregation mechanisms used in groups that do not have explicit
rules.
The issue of intergroup interaction in games has received most attention from social psychol-
ogists. In a recent paper Wildschut et al. [23] provide a “meta-study” of a large body (some 130
studies) of experimental evidence on what is known in psychology as a group discontinuity eﬀect:
the general tendency of groups of agents to behave more aggressively than individuals in similar
circumstances, be that due to social reinforcement of aggressive behavior, greater anonymity within
the group, or emergence of fear of aggressive behavior by the opposing group. It is only recently
that the issue has been taken on by economists, who have often redeﬁned, occasionally somewhat
simplistically, the discontinuity hypothesis as the hypothesis of “greater rationality” of groups.
This hypothesis has so far received mixed support. To mention but a few of these studies Bornstein
and Yaniv [2] claim to observe more aggressive proposer behavior in group ultimatum games, while
Bornstein et al. [3] see earlier group exit in the centipede game, both pointing towards the back-ward induction outcomes of these games. Similarly, Cox [7] observes that in an investment game
group decisions seem to correspond to action of the most aggressive member and, thus, most closely
“game-theoretic” in terms of monetary payoﬀs. Kocher and Schmidt [13] observe more aggressive
group behavior to prevail in a gift-exchange experiment even when group members are not allowed
any face-to-face interaction but rather achieve decision via a computer communication protocol.1
On the other hand, in a context of the dictator game Cason and Mui [6] observe that more generous
(other-regarding) agents dominate group decisions. The issue thus remains unsettled, and Camerer
[5] includes further study of the manner in which groups act in games as one of the ten top open
research questions in behavioral economics.
One diﬃculty involved in studies of intergroup interaction is that the intragroup decision-making
may be diﬃcult to observe or categorize, unless it is explicitly imposed. Of course, the imposition
of the preference aggregation rule may have direct impact on the way the game is played. Thus,
Wildschut et al. [23] conclude that when a group has to reach a single decision (in many experiments
by consensus) agents tend to behave more in accordance with the discontinuity hypothesis than
when the group decision is a sum of decentralized individual decisions. A further question is to
which extent intragroup decision rules matter. Here, it seems, the evidence so far is extremely
limited. While the decision rule obviously aﬀects the group decision, it is another matter if this
is understood and internalized by the opposing group. In a few studies which asked that question
previously, as in Messick et al. [16], and in a very recent study by Bosman et al. [4], the answer
seems to be negative: members of a group tend to view the opposing group as unitary and ignore its
decision process. On the whole, the issue remains underexplored, and our study seems to challenge
some of the earlier conclusions.
The one-on-one ultimatum bargaining game has been repeatedly played in laboratory settings,
beginning with Guth et al. [10], and a number of robust regularities has emerged, as summarized
in Roth [21] and Camerer [5]. In particular, it has been repeatedly observed that, at least in
industrialized societies, the proposers of the ultimatum tend to oﬀer the responders a sizeable
chunk of the payoﬀ (often in excess of 40%), while the “too low” oﬀers get consistently rejected
by the responder side.2 While at variance with the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction for
1It should be noted that the communication protocol in this study is rather complicated, perhaps designed to
simulate face-to-face interaction; its game-theoretic analysis would be challenging, and the authors do not attempt
it.
2An intriguing exception is reported by Henrich [11], who presents results showing that in a pre-industrial society
2a game with purely monetary payoﬀs, it could be explained by an uncontrolled non-monetary
payoﬀ component, such as utility of fairness or of punishing “insulting” oﬀers. This is indeed the
conclusion Ochs and Roth [17] draw from a series of sequential bargaining experiments. In fact,
for a number of such experiments, Prasnikar and Roth [18] suggest that ultimatum-proposers may
be trying to maximize monetary payoﬀ subject to the empirical rejection behavior of ultimatum-
responders, which, in turn, might be generated by unobserved (and uncontrolled) payoﬀs( p o s s i b l y
due to some sort of interdependent preferences).
Kennan and Wilson [14] suggested that “[e]ven the basic single-oﬀer ultimatum game becomes
a game of private information in which the optimal oﬀer depends on beliefs about how much the
responder is willing to forgo to punish unfair behavior”. In other words, laboratory bargaining
games should be modeled as incomplete information games, which in the ultimatum game context
may be done by explicitly modeling rejection thresholds as responder types. This has been formal-
ized by, among others, Levine [15], who incorporated altruism and/or spitefulness into individual
preferences; the equity-reciprocity-competition model of Bolton and Ockenfels [1], who allow the
agents to care about their relative position in the society; and the fairness model of Fehr and
Schmidt [8]. In these models, the agents may only be aware of the preference distribution in the
population, but not of the actual types in front of them. In the context of the ultimatum game,
this generates an incomplete information game with ultimatum-proposers facing a belief about the
rejection probability of any given ultimatum. In this paper we provide a simple model in the spirit
of Bolton and Ockenfels [1] and Fehr and Schmidt [8], narrowly targeted to provide comparative
empirical predictions for our experiment. We deliberately remain agnostic about features of the
model that cannot be tested in our setting. It is thus consistent with a variety of extant incomplete
information models.
As mentioned above, until quite recently all laboratory ultimatum bargaining games have been
implemented in a one-on-one setting. A 1998 study (Bornstein and Yaniv [2]) has suggested that
when the ultimatum game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than by individuals,
the division of the payoﬀ is substantially aﬀected in favor of the ultimatum-proposers (though,
on should note that their sample is quite small, one round with a total of 20 one-on-one and 20
group-on-group; in fact, they observe only two rejections). In their language, this result can be
of Machiguenga Indians in Peru the bargaining outcomes are signiﬁcantly closer to giving everything to the ultimatum
proposer. This has given rise to a fascinating worldwide “anthropological” research project, as reported in Camerer
[5].
3explained by thinking of groups as “more rational” agents than individuals, if rationality is viewed as
playing closer to the subgame-perfect outcome of the ultimatum game with pure monetary payoﬀs.
Note, however, that if the payoﬀs of ultimatum-responders have non-monetary components, the
equilibrium prediction of the monetary-payoﬀ game is, in fact, “incorrect”; for this explanation to
work, members of groups somehow persuade each other to ignore the non-monetary payoﬀs. In a
concluding remark, Bornstein and Yaniv [2] suggest that an alternative explanation could be that
ultimatum proposers take into account an implicit decision-making process of the responder group
(such as, perhaps, majority voting). This conjecture cannot be tested without either a control for
or an explicit model of such a process.
A couple of papers have attempted to deal with the issue of intragroup decision-making. Robert
and Carnevale [20] claim to observe in a group-on-group ultimatum game that proposer groups tend
to follow the preferences of its “most competitive” member (they elicit the individual preferences
from observations of one-one-one play by the same agents). The result is a substantially more
aggressive proposer group behavior, as in Bornstein and Yaniv [2]. Unfortunately, their respon-
der groups are actually ﬁctitious, and the proposers don’t explicitly observe rejections; it is thus
impossible to ﬁgure out if they are best-responding to anything on the responder side.
A more explicit laboratory implementation of intragroup decision-making has been attempted
by Messick et al. [16], who compare group-on-group bargaining under two explicit decision-making
procedures in the responder group: in one treatment the responders must unanimously agree to
accept the oﬀer, while in the other the unanimity is required for rejection. Strikingly, they do
not observe any diﬀerence in proposer behavior, even though the best response in the former
treatment would imply much less aggressive ultimatums than in the latter (since they did not do
a benchmark one-on-one treatment, we can’t compare their group-on-group results with the one-
on-one case). However, there seems to be an important peculiarity in their experimental design,
which complicates interpretation of their results. The problem is in their technique for eliciting
the responders’ strategies. In standard ultimatum bargaining, the experimenter observes only
acceptance or rejection of the actual oﬀer, but not the entire strategy, which should specify what
the agent would have done if he were to get a diﬀerent oﬀer. Messick et al. [16] attempt to overcome
this by requiring the responders to report their entire strategies before they see the oﬀer (in fact,
in at least some of their treatments, they explicitly tell this to the proposers). Unfortunately, this
forces the responders to commit, thereby destroying the sequential nature of the game. Thus, in
4their game subgame-perfection provides no reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium, and, as is well-
known, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria in this game, with pretty much any division of the
surplus being a possible equilibrium outcome.
While the previously mentioned studies only look at a single-shot bargaining interaction be-
tween inexperienced subjects, Grosskopf [9] has studied how behavior changes as agents learn from
their experience. In a comparison between one-on-one and one-on-group ultimatum bargaining
(with the group decision rule similar to one of the treatments in Messick et al.’s [16]: unanimity
required for rejection) she concludes that though the agents might not be able to ﬁgure out the dif-
ference immediately, with learning a clear diﬀerence emerges between the play against groups versus
play against individuals. In particular, she observes that when playing against groups proposers
eventually learn to be more aggressive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop an explicit model of
ultimatum bargaining under incomplete information and derive testable predictions. In section 3,
we discuss experimental design. In section 4, we present laboratory results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We start by providing a simple incomplete information model of ultimatum bargaining, speciﬁed
to the extent we shall be able to implement it in the lab. As noted above, our model most closely
resembles those of Bolton and Ockenfels [1] and Fehr and Schmidt [8].
For simplicity, we shall assume that the proposers care only for their monetary payoﬀ,w h i l e
the responders may have other motivations. While relaxable, this assumption has some support
in earlier experimental results, such as Prasnikar and Roth [18], as discussed in Roth [21]. This
assumption is also supported by the experiments with varying information about payoﬀs conducted
by Kagel et al. [12], in which proposers behave more aggressively, if they know that responders
don’t know the payoﬀ size and so can’t ﬁgure out if they are treated “unfairly” or “insultingly” by
the proposers. This suggests that when unfairness works on one’s favor, many people do no dislike
it too much, as long as they can’t be observed as unfair or punished for it. In other words, assuming
that one cares about inequity only when it works against him or her, seems not to contradict the
data too much. In the same vein, Fehr and Schmidt [8] cite psychological literature to support the
assumption in their model that people dislike unfairness that works in their favor more than they
5dislike the same when it works against them. Since in ultimatum games the proposers typically get
at least half the total payoﬀ, we shall, for now, go further and just suppress the fairness component
of their utility. Incorporating some sort of non-monetary preference in proposers’ utility does not
present a serious diﬃculty, since it would only aﬀect quantitative, but not qualitative predictions
as to the comparative behavior of agents in diﬀerent treatments of our experiment.
Therefore, we assume that each (weakly) risk-averse proposer has a strictly increasing and
concave Bernoulli utility function of money up (xp), where xp is how much money she gets.3
The responder also likes money, but she also gets utility from being treated fairly. In case she
is facing a bad oﬀer, she will prefer to reject, since that would result in a fairer distribution, or
since it will punish the “insolent” proposer. In general, we shall remain agnostic on the true nature
of the possible rejection (our experiment is not designed to elicit this information). One possible
assumption here is that the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs of the proposer and the responder enters
his utility, which is thus ur (xr,x r − xp,D), where xr is her monetary wealth and D = accept/reject
is her action. Allowing the utility to depend on acceptance or rejection makes it possible to model
explicitly preference for “punishing” the proposer of a distastefully low amount (this could be
easily suppressed in the ﬁrst approximation). Note, of course, that to the extent that there are
only two agents involved in actual play, the pair (xr,x r − xp) describes the entire monetary payoﬀ
distribution between them (in this setting our approach is equivalent, both to the Bolton and
Ockenfels [1] assumption that the agents care about their share of total prize and the Fehr and
Schmidt [8] assumption that they care about absolute diﬀerences). We assume the function ur to
be increasing in both arguments.
The total payoﬀ size available for sharing between a proposer and a responder is π > 0. The
proposer has to choose a number x ∈ [0,π] that she will oﬀer to the responder, with the balance of
π − x being left to herself. The responder will accept the oﬀer whenever
ur (x,2x − π,A) ≥ u(0,0,D)
and reject otherwise.4
3We are aware of the questions raised about the appropriateness of assuming risk-aversion for experimental-sized
stakes, or, more speciﬁcally, the apparent inconsistency between the small-stake and large-stake estimates of risk-
aversion (see Rabin[19]). Since our results, in fact, do not depend on the presence or absence of risk-aversion we
choose to allow the possibility of it.
4For simplicity we assume acceptance in case of indiﬀerence; since it is going to be a zero-probability event in the
incomplete information version of the game, this assumption is innocuous.
6If the proposer knows preferences of the responder, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is obvious.
The proposer should choose x∗ ∈ [0,π]t h a ts o l v e s .
ur (x∗,2x∗ − π,A)=u(0,0,R)
and the responder should only accept oﬀers as high as, or higher than this x∗. In particular, if ur
is independent of the third variable (the agent only cares about the income distribution, and does





. Indeed, oﬀers above half the prize size are almost
never rejected.
Of course, the key problem here is that the proposer can’t ex ante observe (and experimenter
can’t exactly control) the responders preferences. The only thing subject to observation and exper-
imental control is the monetary payoﬀ x. Therefore, the only thing that the proposer may know is
that each responder τ will reject oﬀers below a certain cut-oﬀ value xτ and that this xτ is drawn
from some probability distribution with the support [0,π] with the distribution function F (x).5
Clearly, F (x) can be interpreted as the acceptance probability of oﬀer x.
We shall denote the probability of rejection P (x)=1− F (x). Suppose that P (π)=0( i fy o u
give everything to the responder she always accepts) and P (0) = 1 (oﬀers of nothing are always
rejected), both of which (especially the former) are very robust empirical regularities observed in
ultimatum game experiments. These assumptions clearly imply impossibility of corner solutions to
the proposer’s maximization problem. The proposer’s expected payoﬀ from the ultimatum x is
Π(x)=up (π − x)(1− P (x))
Assuming diﬀerentiability of up and P (both, essentially, not falsiﬁable empirically), clearly u0
p ≥ 0
and P0 ≤ 0. The ﬁrst order necessary condition for expected utility maximization in the interior is
u0
p (π − x)(1− P(x)) = −up (π − x)P0(x)
Furthermore, a necessary condition for maximization is P (x) < 1( s i n c eP (x) = 1 would guarantee
az e r op a y o ﬀ). The ﬁrst order conditions are easily seen to be suﬃcient if P (x)i sc o n v e xa tx.







I nf a c t ,t h i ss e e m st ob ec o n ﬁrmed empirically, since large oﬀers almost never get rejected. On the other hand,
large oﬀers (above half of the total prize), though rare, do occur, which can’t be explained as a best response to






. One explanation for this could be
that some proposers may have a model of recipients in mind, which allows for punishment utility and, hence, lower
cut-oﬀs.
7Since we do not observe P (x) directly, in principle, there is a possibility of multiple local maxima,
though multiplicity of global maxima is clearly non-generic in the space of utility functions and
rejection probabilities.
2.1 Group bargaining
The group bargaining framework has to be designed as closely as possible to the one-on-one treat-
ment in order to minimize any unmodelled diﬀerence in behavior. For this reason, in the model that
follows, as in our experimental design to be discussed later we preserve the symmetry between the
sides, assuming the same group size of proposers and responders and equipartition of the monetary
payoﬀ within each side. This avoids either payoﬀ scale diﬀerences or public good/ eﬃciency aspects
which would be inevitable if the symmetry were to be broken.
Suppose therefore that instead of a one-on-one game the game is between groups of three
proposers and three responders for a prize 3π. The proposers’ share of the prize will be divided
equally between the proposers and the responders’ share between the responders, so that the
monetary payoﬀs to agents are unchanged. An ultimatum x s h a l lm e a nt h a te a c hp r o p o s e rg e t s
π −x, and each receiver gets x. Under these conditions the pair (x,π − x) continues to completely
describe the distribution of the monetary payoﬀs in case of acceptance. We shall ﬁrst analyze
the model under the assumption that the responders’ utilities do not depend on their acceptance/
rejection vote, but only on the distribution of monetary payoﬀs.
Assume that one of the members of the proposer group is chosen to decide which ultimatum
to give. In what follows we explore consequences of four intragroup decision rules among the
responders: dictatorship (a single responder makes the decision to accept or reject) ; majority
decision to accept/ reject; unanimity needed to overturn acceptance; unanimity needed to overturn
rejection. If we assume that there is no utility of rejection per se (ur does not depend on acceptance/
rejection), the dictatorship can be easily seen to be equivalent to the one-to-one game.
In general, the (non-dictatorial) voting games played by the responders will have multiple
equilibria, since, for instance, if I believe that my partners in a group both always vote to accept
and the decision rule is majority, I am indiﬀerent between voting to accept and to reject. Note,
however, that such equilibria involve playing weakly dominated strategies. In fact, for a voter facing
an ultimatum x doing anything other than voting sincerely is weakly dominated by sincere voting
(this is an election between just two alternatives). Therefore, we shall only consider sincere voting
8equilibria.
The above discussion provides an additional reason to give up on eliciting the entire strategies
of responders (as attempted by Messick et al. [16] and discussed in the introduction): even just
the cut-oﬀ acceptance/ rejection strategies are relatively complex objects and if voting over them
would be allowed, empirically disentangling the multiple equilibria could be hard. On the other
hand, at their action node the responders face a simple binary decision: accept or reject the oﬀer
in front of them. Unfortunately, the action of proposers is more complicated: they have to choose
a number in the [0,π] interval. At least initially, we want to avoid voting complications. Therefore,
we shall let each proposer make his ultimatum ignorant of the rest, and then randomly choose one
of the ultimatums to be presented to the responders, making it optimal for each proposer to act as
if he were a dictator on their side of the game.
The following table summarizes the rejection probability under each of the four intragroup
decision rules on the ultimatum responder side, where P (x) is as in the previous section:
Group Decision Rule Default Probability of Rejection
Individual Response - P(x)
Majority Rule - P(x)3 +3 P(x)2(1 − P(x))
Unanimity Rule Accept P(x)3
Unanimity Rule Reject 1 − (1 − P(x))3
This implies, that the proposer’s expected utility for the ultimatum x are as follows:
Group Decision Rule Default Expected Utility: Π(x)
Individual Response - up(π − x)(1 − P(x))
Majority Rule - up(π − x)(1 − P(x))2(1 + 2P(x))
Unanimity Rule Accept up(π − x)(1 − P(x)3)
Unanimity Rule Reject up(π − x)(1 − P(x))3
Hence, the ﬁrst order necessary conditions for expected utility maximization, somewhat simpli-
ﬁed by dividing both sides by equal positive factors, are as follows:
Group Decision Rule Default FOC Expected Utility Maximization
Individual Response - u
0
p(π − x)(1 − P(x)) = −up(π − x)P
0
(x)
Majority Rule - u
0
p(π − x)(1 − P(x))(1 + 2P(x)) = −6up(π − x)P
0
(x)P(x)
Unanimity Rule Accept u
0
p(π − x)(1 − P(x)3)=−3up(π − x)P
0
(x)P2(x)
Unanimity Rule Reject u
0
p(π − x)(1 − P(x)) = −3up(π − x)P
0
(x)
9Once again, adding convexity of P (x) and ensuring that P (x) < 1m a k e st h eﬁrst order
conditions suﬃcient. Unfortunately, without a further assumption on P, multiple local maxima are
possible. Though global maximum, generically (in either P or u), would be unique, multiplicity
of local maxima might allow the global maximum to “jump” depending on the voting rule, which
might create problems with identifying the impact of the rules. Unfortunately, P is not directly
observable either by the experimenters or the subjects. The following assumption, which is satisﬁed
by most “symmetric” models of rejection probability (such as linear, logit or probit) would avoid
this problem.
Assumption A: P (x) is (weakly) convex whenever P (x) ≤ 1
2.
We can now state the following proposition
Proposition 1 A s s u m i n gt h ep r o p o s e r sb e l i e v et h a tn or e c i pient gets utility from punishment, if
assumption A holds, the optimal oﬀer by any risk-averse individual in each treatment will be ranked
as follows (where the subscript UA stands for Unanimity with acceptance default, UR - unanimity
with rejection default, M - majority rule and I - for the one-on-one case):
xUA <x I <x M <x UR if P (x) >
1
4
xUA <x M <x I <x UR if P (x) <
1
4
Proof. The proof is done by comparing ﬁrst order conditions. Assumptions on P we impose
in the one-to-one case (P (0) = 1;P (π)=0 ) ensure that the solution is interior. Furthermore,
assumption A ensures that there is at most one local maximum for each voting rule such that
P (x) ≤ 1
2. But for all voting rules other than unanimity with acceptance default this must be the
global maximum, since the proposer can always ensure the payoﬀ equal to π
2 by oﬀering to share the
prize equally (in the absence of utility from rejection this will always be accepted).
Consider now the optimal oﬀer for the one-on-one case. Then
u0
p (π − xI)(1− P(xI)) = −up (π − xI)P0(xI)
(the condition for the one-on-one case). Then
u0




> −3up (π − xI)P0 (xI)P2 (xI)
10for every P<1.S i n c e o ﬀering a proposal that would spur rejection with probability one cannot
be optimal for the proposer, clearly the inequality holds at the optimal xI. The right hand side is
decreasing in x,t h el e f ti si n c r e a s i n gi nx, hence to restore equality x has to be decreased for the
optimum in the unanimity (with acceptance default) case to be achieved. Of course, unanimity
with acceptance default is the only voting rule for which the true global maximum might involve
P (x) > 1
2, but that implies even more aggressive behavior by the proposers, so that the conclusion
that xUA <x I is maintained.
Similarly
u0
p (π − xI)(1− P(xI)) < −3up (π − xI)P0 (xI)
and x has to be increased to get to the optimum in the unanimity (rejection default) case (in this
case there is no problem with non-uniqueness of the maximum).
We thus have that xUA <x I <x UR. It can be similarly shown that xUA <x M <x UR.F i n a l l y ,
to establish the position of xM vis a vis xI observe that
u0





p (π − xI)(1− P (xI))(1 + 2P (xI)) < −6up (π − xI)P0 (xI)P (xI),i fP (x) >
1
4
To see the necessary direction of change of x divide both sides of the previous inequality condition
by P (x) > 0 to get
u0
p (π − xI)
P (xI)
(1 − P (xI))(1 + 2P (xI)) < (>) − 6up (π − xI)P0 (xI)
with the left-hand side increasing and the right hand side decreasing in x.
It should be stressed that empirical predictions summarized by the Proposition 1 admit a broad
array of the shapes of u and P. Furthermore, the assumptions of (weak) risk-aversion and (weak)
convexity of P in the relevant part of the domain are not necessary and could be further relaxed.
Predictions of the play against the unanimity groups are very straightforward; less so with the
case of the majority rule. In general, the equilibrium rejection probability, of course, depends on
the proposers’ degree of risk-aversion and the shape of the rejection probability P (x), both of which
are hard to control in an experiment. In previous studies [21] empirical rejection probabilities have
usually been below 1
4 (except occasionally, as in Israel - Roth [21] - where it has been closer to
111
3). Our ex ante expectation, therefore, is that playing against the majority rule group will on
average result in more aggressive behavior than the one-on-one treatment. However, the initially
more “aggressive” (less risk-averse) proposers are predicted to moderate in this case (though they
would stay more aggressive than the more risk-averse types)!
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Structure of the Ultimatum Bargaining
The experimental design used directly measures the relative performance of the ultimatum bar-
gaining game when two groups of players have to bargain over an amount of money: A group of (3)
players, the proposers, proposes a division of a ﬁxed amount of money, and a second group of (3)
players, the responders, accepts or rejects it. After observing the proposal, responders must decide
whether to accept or reject the proposal following a pre-determined voting rule. If responders re-
ject, no group receives any pay, and if responders accept, each group receives the amount speciﬁed
in the proposal.
Each voting rule speciﬁes a treatment for our group-on-group ultimatum bargaining. We con-
sider the following three voting rules:
Unanimity with Rejection Default:A no ﬀer is considered accepted when every member of
the responder group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.
Unanimity with Acceptance Default:A no ﬀer is considered rejected when every member
of the responder group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered accepted.
Majority Rule:A no ﬀer is considered accepted when at least two members of the responder
group votes to accept it. Otherwise it is considered rejected.
As a control treatment, we use a standard one-on-one ultimatum bargaining where an agent,
the proposer, proposes a division of a ﬁxed amount of money, and a second agent, the responder,
accepts or rejects it. If responder rejects, no individual receives any pay, and if responder accepts,
each individual receives the amount speciﬁed in the proposal. This control treatment tests, ﬁrst,
whether individual behavior is aﬀected by group size and, second, whether the comparative statics
predictions of the oﬀer size hold.6
6An alternative control treatment could be following: two groups of players have to bargain over an amount of
money, but one agent (a “dictator”) is chosen within each group to decide for the entire group .
12Table 1: Experimental Design
Experimental Treatments of Group #o fS u b j e c t s
the Ultimatum Bargaining Size per Session
Standard One-on-One 1 24 and 30
Majority Rule 3 24 and 30
Unanimity with Rejection Default 3 30 and 30
Unanimity with Acceptance Default 3 30 and 30
Table 1 brieﬂy summarizes the experimental treatments, the group size, and the number of
subjects per session.
3.2 Design Parameters
This section describes the basic parameters and the general procedure of the experiment.
Participants and Venue. Subjects were drawn from a wide cross—section of students at Instituto
Tecnol´ ogico Aut´ onomo de M´ exico (ITAM) in Mexico City. Each subject participated in only one
session. The experiment was run at ITAM using computers.
Experimental Sessions. In order to familiarize subjects with the procedures, two practice periods
were conducted before the 10 real (played for money) periods.
Agent Types. For each of the group-on-group treatments, each participant was designated as a
member of a type A group (i.e., proposers) or a member of a type B group (i.e., responders). For
the one-on-one treatment, each participant was designated either as a type A agent (i.e., proposer)
or as a type B agent (i.e., responder) before the beginning of the practice periods. All designations
were determined randomly by the computer at the beginning of the experimental session, and
remained constant during the entire session.
Matching Procedure and Group Size. For each of the group-on-group treatments, membership
composition of each group was changed in a random fashion, so that each participant formed part
of a new group (of the same type) at the beginning of each period. Each group consisted of exactly
three participants. For the one-on-one treatment, a type A agent was paired with a type B agent,
and each pairing was randomized for each period. Furthermore, agents did not know who they
were paired with in any given period.
13Bargaining Procedure. Subjects were informed that they had to bargain over 100 points. For
the group-on-group treatments, the task of each pair of groups was to divide 100 points in each
period using the following rules: a) group A had to make a ﬁnal oﬀer of points to group B; b)
to make a ﬁnal oﬀer, each group A member had to write and send an oﬀer via computer, each
oﬀer being in the range from 0 to 100 points; c) one of these oﬀers was chosen randomly by the
computer as group A ﬁnal oﬀer to group B; d) upon receiving the ﬁnal oﬀer, group B members
had to decide whether to accept or reject the oﬀer according to the voting rule announced for this
session. No communication (except as explicitly discussed in this and next paragraph) was allowed
among participants. For the one-on-one treatment, a very similar procedure was followed: a type
A agent had to make and send an oﬀer to an agent B, and after receiving the oﬀer, agent B had to
on his own decide whether to accept or reject it.
Information Feedback. For the group-on-group treatments, group A members observed simul-
taneously all the oﬀers made by each group member, and the ﬁnal oﬀer sent to group B. Group B
members observed the ﬁnal oﬀer, but not the other oﬀers made by group A members. At the end of
each round, members of both groups were informed whether the ﬁnal oﬀer was accepted or rejected,
the number of individual acceptance and rejection votes (between 0 and 3) in the responder group,
and the number of points obtained by their group in that round. For the one-on-one treatment,
each agent type received complete feedback about whether the oﬀer was accepted or rejected and
her own amount of points obtained for that round.7
Payoﬀs. The ﬁnal payoﬀ was determined by randomly selecting one round out of the 10 real
periods. The pay for the chosen period was calculated as follows: Each group member got $2.6
Mexican pesos (about 23 US cents) for each point obtained by her own group, in addition to the
basic amount of $20 pesos (roughly US$1.75) for participation. Thus, each pair of groups eﬀectively
bargained over $780 pesos (around US$68 in Spring 2004 when the experimental sessions where
conducted). For the one-on-one treatment, each agents pair had to bargain over $260 pesos.
7One peculiarity of these treatments is the fact that the proposer group is observing the decision made by each
member of the responder group. The purpose of revealing this information is the fact that it helps proposers to
update their beliefs about the probability of individual and group rejection, and thus may induce some kind of
learning behavior across periods.
14Table 2: Summary of Experimental Results: One-on-One and Group Majority Rule
Oﬀer One-on-One Majority Rule
Range %FO ﬀ. %IR e j . %AO ﬀ. %FO ﬀ. %IR e j . %GR e j .
> 50 5.9 0.0 9.3 8.9 0.0 0.0
(16) (0) (25) (8) (0) (0)
=5 0 5.6 0.0 10.0 12.2 6.1 0.0
(15) (0) (27) (11) (2) (0)
45 - 49 13.7 2.7 7.4 2.2 16.7 0.0
37 (1) (20) (2) (1) (0)
40 - 44 25.2 1.5 8.1 6.7 16.7 16.7
(68) (1) (22) (6) (3) (1)
35 - 39 14.4 20.5 18.1 20.0 18.5 16.7
(39) (8) (49) (18) (10) (3)
30 - 34 11.5 6.5 16.7 14.4 20.5 15.4
(31) (2) (45) (13) (8) (2)
25 - 29 13.7 37.8 20.4 20.0 24.1 16.7
(37) (14) (55) (18) (13) (3)
< 25 10.0 81.5 10.0 15.6 61.9 64.3
(27) (22) (27) (14) (26) (9)
All Oﬀ. 100.0 17.8 100.0 100.0 23.3 20.0
(270) (48) (270) (90) (63) (18)
Statistics
Avg. 37 27 35 33 27 25
Med. 40 25 34 31 25 25
Var. 93 52 190 122 97 87
#E x c l . 2 2
Note: The number in parentheses below each percentage represents the
occurrence’s absolute frequency.
15Table 3: Summary of Experimental Results: Group Unanimity Rules
Oﬀer Unanimity with Rejection Default Unanimity with Acceptance Default
Range %AO ﬀ. %FO ﬀ. %IR e j . %GR e j . %AO ﬀ. %FO ﬀ. %IR e j . %GR e j .
> 50 14.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 6.0 5.6 0.0
(42) (10) (0) (0) (24) (6) (1) (0)
=5 0 12.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.0 0.0 0.0
(38) (10) (0) (0) (7) (3) (0) (0)
45 - 49 33.7 32.0 5.2 15.6 11.0 17.0 5.9 0.0
(101) (32) (5) (5) (33) (17) (3) (0)
40 - 44 18.0 20.0 13.3 25.0 16.3 19.0 19.3 0.0
(54) (20) (8) (5) (49) (19) (11) (0)
35 - 39 9.7 12.0 22.2 50.0 27.3 20.0 35.0 5.0
(29) (12) (8) (6) (82) (20) (21) (1)
30 - 34 7.0 9.0 29.6 66.7 15.7 17.0 49.0 17.6
(21) (9) (8) (6) (47) (17) (25) (3)
25 - 29 2.3 3.0 66.7 100.0 8.0 5.0 33.3 0.0
(7) (3) (6) (3) (24) (5) (5) (0)
< 25 2.7 4.0 91.7 100.0 11.3 13.0 59.0 23.1
(8) (4) (11) (4) (34) (13) (23) (3)
All Oﬀ. 100.0 100.0 15.3 29.0 100.0 100.0 29.7 7.0
(300) (100) (46) (29) (300) (100) (89) (7)
Statistics
Avg. 44 43 29 33 36 37 30 26
Med. 47 45 30 35 36 38 33 33
Var. 113 121 178 139 125 143 118 110
#E x c l . 0 0
Note: The number in parentheses below each percentage represents the occurrence absolute frequency.
164 Experimental Results
This section compares the experimental results from the four treatments of ultimatum bargaining
discussed in the previous section. We concentrate on measuring how diﬀerent voting rules aﬀect
individuals and group rejection rates and proposals.
Table 2 describes for the one-on-one treatment the distribution of individual proposals and
rejections aggregated across all ten periods. The oﬀer range indicates the amount of points a
proposer oﬀers a responder. Consider, for example, the oﬀer range from 35 to 39. In the one-to one
treatment the number of proposals within this range was 39 out of a total of 270; the proportion
of the total number of oﬀers was 14.4% (39/270). Likewise, the rejection number within this range
was 8 out of 39 oﬀers; so the resultant rejection rate was 20.5% (8/39).
In the same table we also have the data for majority rule group-on-group treatment. As in the
one-on-one case, consider the oﬀer range from 35 to 39. The total number of proposals within this
range was 49 out of 270 oﬀers; thus the total oﬀers proportion was 18.1% (49/270). Since just 1
out of 3 proposals was actually sent to a responder group, the ﬁnal proposals are simply a random
selection of the individual ones. The number of ﬁnal proposals within this range was 18 out of a
total of 90 oﬀers sent. Therefore, the ﬁnal oﬀers proportion was 20.0% (18/90). Since all 3 members
of a responder group received the same oﬀer, the individual rejection number within this range was
10 out of 54 (18×3), implying the individual rejection rate for this range of 18.5% (10/54). At
group level, the rejection number within this range was 3 out of 18, resulting in a 16.7% (3/18)
group rejection rate. Table 3 describes the same information for both unanimity treatments.
At the bottom of Tables 2 and 3 some summary statistics are shown for the oﬀers made and
oﬀers rejected. For the one-on-one and majority rule, the statistics exclude some subjects oﬀers.
For the one-on-one, two subjects were excluded: one subject that oﬀered 100 for 8 consecutive
periods and then 45 twice and another subject that oﬀered 1 for 6 consecutive periods and then
15, 50, 30, 20.8 For the majority rule, two subjects oﬀers were excluded: one subject that oﬀered 5
times more than 90 then 50 and then 4 times less than 15, and one that oﬀered 5 times more than
90, 3 times between 70 and 80, twice at 50 and then oﬀered 1.9 For both unanimity treatments, no
8The subjects excluded for the one-on-one treatment were subjects 63 and 74. We believe the former of these to
be simply confused about the meaning of the oﬀer (whether it was the oﬀer or the fraction retained by him). The
latter, probably, took some game theory class.
9The subjects excluded for the group-on-group majority rule were subjects 359 and 368. Subject 359 subject oﬀers
were picked as a group ﬁnal oﬀer in ﬁve periods. These oﬀers were the following: 100, 100, 95, 50 and 5. Subject 368
17subjects were excluded.10
4.1 Individual Rejection Behavior
Considering all ﬁnal oﬀers together, group rejection rate decreases from 29.0% (29/100) in una-
nimity with rejection default to 20.0% (18/90) and 7.0% (7/100) in majority rule and unanimity
with acceptance default, respectively.11 At individual level, rejection rate decreases from 29.7%
(89/300) in unanimity with acceptance default to 23.3% (63/270) and 15.3% (46/300) in majority
rule and unanimity with rejection default, respectively. For the one-on-one treatment, rejection
rate is clearly the same, 17.8% (48/270). Therefore, we observe a rejection rates rank order rever-
sion among diﬀerent voting rules when we move from group level to individual level, preserving the
position of the one-on-one treatment somewhere in the middle closer to majority rule. Of course,
in itself this is fairly meaningless, since it could result from diﬀerent oﬀer distributions in diﬀerent
treatments.
First thing we check is whether group rejection rates diﬀer across treatments conditional on the
oﬀer size. In particular, we expected that group rejection rate for unanimity with rejection default
should be higher than for the one-on-one treatment, and these two higher than for the unanimity
with acceptance default. Meanwhile, majority rule rejection rate should be almost indistinguishable
from one-on-one rejection rate. Second thing we check is whether decisions within a group aﬀect
individual behavior. That is, whether there is a diﬀerence in behavior when an individual have to
decide by herself compare to when she has to decide within a group, following a speciﬁcd e c i s i o n
rule. We expected that individual rejection rates should not diﬀer across diﬀerent treatments.
Thus, group decision can be considered as the sum of decentralized individual decisions.
oﬀers were picked as a group ﬁnal oﬀer in four periods. These oﬀers were the following: 90, 97, 95, and 1. As in the
one-on-one case the subjects might have been confused about the meaning of the oﬀer.
10For the one-on-one treatment, the average and variance of proposals were for the whole data set 38 and 236,
respectively. The average and variance of rejected proposals were 23 and 118, respectively. For the group-on-group
majority rule, the average and variance of total proposals were for the whole data set 37 and 297, respectively. The
average and variance of ﬁnal proposals were 37 and 394, respectively. The average and variance of rejected proposals
at individual level were 25 and 131, respectively. And the average and variance of rejected proposals at group level
were 23 and 129, respectively.
11In a previous analysis (Slonim and Roth, [22]), only oﬀers less than 50% were considered since it was expected
that anything above or equal to 50% would be accepted. In our analysis, however, we consider all oﬀers since some
(although very few) oﬀers above 50% were actually rejected at the individual level.
18Table 4: Individual Probability of Oﬀer Rejection: Logit Estimation
First Period All Periods
Coeﬃcients Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Intercept 3.804... 4.680... 4.750... 4.574... 5.631... 5.375...
Oﬀer -0.142... -0.183... -0.201... -0.203... -0.206... -0.207...
URejection 0.928 0.793 0.698
(p = 0.306) (p = 0.270) (p = 0.363)
UAcceptance 1.151 0.990 1.019
(p = 0.207) (p = 0.206) (p = 0.197)
Majority 0.250 -0.147 -0.139
(p = 0.741) (p = 0.808) (p = 0.826)
Period -0.131... -0.129...
#o fO b s . 112 112 1093 1093 1093 1093







(#var) (p = 0.479) (p = 0.251) (p = 0.229)
.: p<0.05, ..: p<0.01 and ...: p<0.001.
19Table 5: Group Probability of Oﬀer Rejection: Logit Estimation
First Period All Periods
Coeﬃcients Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI
Intercept 3.304. 4.596. 3.935... 5.301... 4.862... 6.234...
Oﬀer -0.134.. -0.180. -0.215... -0.229... -0.220... -0.236...
URejection 1.754 2.171.. 2.239..
(p = 0.185)
UAcceptance 0.188 -2.931.. -2.911..
(p = 0.894)
Majority -0.914 -1.367 -1.447
(p = 0.273) (p = 0.127) (p = 0.122)
Period -0.141 -0.1360
(p = 0.072) (p = 0.074)
#o fO b s . 54 54 531 531 531 531






(p = 0.360) (p = 0.072) (p = 0.074)
.: p<0.05, ..: p<0.01 and ...: p<0.001.
204.1.1 Rejection Behavior: First Period
Group rejection rates for all ﬁrst period oﬀers were 33.3% (3/9), 30.0% (3/10), 20.0% (5/25)
and 10.0% (1/10) in majority rule, unanimity with rejection default, one-on-one treatment, and
unanimity with acceptance default, respectively. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in rejection rates were
rejected for all treatment, but for the unanimity with acceptance default treatment vs. majority rule
(z = −1.65, p<0.05).12 At individual level, rejection rates were 20.0% in unanimity with rejection
default (6/30), one-on-one treatment (5/25), and unanimity with acceptance default (6/30), and
44.4% (12/27) in majority rule. A signiﬁcant diﬀerence in individual rejection rate was found just
for majority rule.13
Slonim and Roth [22] had pointed out at least two reasons that explain these ambiguous results:
a) sample size and b) diﬀerences among oﬀer distributions across treatments. Since we are looking
at decisions made by groups, the number of responses shrinks from 3 at individual to 1 at group
level.14 On the other hand, since there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in oﬀer distributions across
treatments, there are oﬀer ranges within which we do observe rejections for some treatments and
do not observe rejections for other treatments.
Following Slonim and Roth [22], we consider two diﬀerent models for estimating rejection prob-
ability using data set from the ﬁrst period in order to control for “equivalent oﬀers”:
Pr(Rejecti =1 )=F(α + βofferOfferi)( 1 )
Pr(Rejecti =1 ) = F(α + βofferOfferi (2)
+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority)
where Offeri is the oﬀer responder i receives from 0 to 100; URejection, UAcceptance and
Majority are dummies for each of the voting rules; F(zi)= 1
1+e−zi is the cumulative logistic
distribution function; and Rejecti =1m e a n st h a ta no ﬀer was rejected. For these and further esti-
mation analyses we exclude the oﬀers made by the four subjects mentioned before for the one-on-one
and group-on-group majority rule.
12For the one-on-one vs. unanimity with rejection default and the one-on-one vs. unanimity with acceptance
default, the one-tailed proportion test results are: z = −1.17, p =0 .120 and z =1 .29, p =0 .098., respectively. For
the one-on-one vs. majority rule a two-tailed proportion test result is: z = −1.54, p =0 .124.
13For the one-on-one vs. majority rule a two-tailed proportion test results is: z = −2.53, p<0.05.
14It should be noted, that our sample size is not particulary small by the literature standards. Thus, Borstein and
Yaniv [2] have only 20 one-on-one and 20 group-on-group observations (they only observe ﬁnal group decisions). In
all they observe only 2 rejections, making it diﬃcult to make any conclusions about rejection probabilities.
21Table 4 and 5 show the logit estimations for these two models at individual and group levels,
respectively. Model II checks whether diﬀerent voting rules aﬀect individual rejection probability
in addition to the oﬀer size considered in Model I. We should expect the oﬀer size coeﬃcient be
less than zero (βoffer < 0), meaning that while an oﬀer is higher the probability of rejection
should be lower. At individual level, we should expect all treatment coeﬃcients be equal to zero
(βur = βua = βm = 0). At group level, we should expect that all three treatment coeﬃcients diﬀer
in sign (βur > 0, βua < 0, βm = 0), where a positive coeﬃcient should indicate a higher probability
of rejection for a given oﬀer than a negative coeﬃcient.
Model I shows similar results at both individual and group levels. The oﬀer size coeﬃcient
(βoffer)i ss i g n i ﬁcant and correct in sign. For Model II, none of the treatment coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In addition, the inclusion of these treatment variables does not
contribute to the overall performance of the estimation. A χ2 test result indicates that the null
hypothesis of βur = βua = βm = 0 cannot be rejected either at the individual level (p =0 .479)
or at the group level (p =0 .360). This satisﬁes our expectations for individual analysis. That is,
individual behavior do not seem to be aﬀected by acting within a group. At group level, however,
these results does not seem to give support to our initial expectations.15
Summing up our results, smaller oﬀers results in a higher probability of rejection and we cannot
reject the null that treatment coeﬃcients have no eﬀect on rejection rates at group level (βur =
βua = βm =0 ) . T h a ti s ,d i ﬀerent treatments do not aﬀect group rejection probabilities.16 Since,
however, the individual and group conditional rejection probabilities cannot all be actually the
same (section 2 above provides a formula relating them), it remains to conclude that we simply do
not have enough observations in one period to make any statistical conclusions.
4.1.2 Rejection Behavior: All periods
We are now going to consider next the data set for all ten periods. Following Slonim and Roth
[22], we consider four diﬀerent models for estimating rejection probability using data set from all
15In addition, note that although not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the sign of the unanimity with acceptance
default coeﬃcient (βua) at group level is opposite to what was expected.
16Results for the last period were even more ambiguous. The unanimity with rejection default coeﬃcient showed
signiﬁcance for a p<0.01 at individual level. On the other hand, the oﬀer size coeﬃc i e n tw a sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for a p =0 .169 at group level. Model II could not be implemented for the group analysis since
t h em a j o r i t yr u l er e j e c t i o nr a t ed i dn o ts h o wv a r i a t i o n .
22ten periods:
Pr(Rejecti =1 )=F(α + βofferOfferi)( 3 )
Pr(Rejecti =1 ) = F(α + βofferOfferi (4)
+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority)
Pr(Rejecti =1 )=F(α + βofferOfferi + βperiodPeriod)( 5 )
Pr(Rejecti =1 ) = F(α + βofferOfferi + βperiodPeriod (6)
+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority)
where Periodis the time period in which a decision was taken and all other variables preserve the
same meaning as in previous section. Table 4 and 5 show the logit estimations for these four models
at individual and group levels, respectively.17 We did not have a deﬁnite expectations about the
sign of coeﬃcient period: βperiod. A negative coeﬃcient should indicate the responders willingness
to reject less often as time pass.18
17This is actually random eﬀect logit, to account for individual agent variability.
18We also evaluated other model speciﬁcations. These results are not shown for reasons explained below. The
additional models evaluated were the following:
Pr(Rejecti =1 ) = f(α + βofferOfferi + βperiodPeriod
+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority
+Period∗ (βpurURejection + βpuaUAcceptance+ βpmMajority))




+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation takes into account the possibility of diﬀerences in rejection rates across periods within each
treatments. We could not reject the null hypothesis that βpurd = βpuad = βpmr =0f o rap<0.5, indicating that a
restricted model does a better performance in explaining rejection probability.
The second speciﬁcation introduces a dummy variable for every period, treating time as a discrete time variable.
This speciﬁcation also helps to check the validity of considering the period variable as a continuos variable. At the
individual level, we reject the null hypothesis that all coeﬃcients were diﬀerent from zero for a p<0.05. Therefore,
discrete time contributes to explaining rejection rate variations across periods. However, this was not the case at
group level. On the other hand, we could not reject at individual level the null hypothesis 44β2 −
P10
i=3 βi =0f o ra
p<0.05, indicating that the description of time inﬂuence using a continuos variable will be indistinguishable from
using a discrete variable. We ﬁnally decided to treat time as a continuos variable for our analyses.
At group level, another model speciﬁcation was considered:
Pr(Rejecti =1 ) = f(α + βofferOfferi + βperiodPeriod
+βurURejection + βuaUAcceptance+ βmMajority)
+βomOfferi ∗ Majority)
23As is seen in Table 4, Model IV shows no signiﬁcance for the treatment coeﬃcients at individual
level. A χ2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of βur = βua = βm = 0 cannot be rejected
for a p =0 .251, favoring the restricted Model III. While preserving the signiﬁcance and sign for the
oﬀer size coeﬃcient (βoffer < 0), Model V also shows signiﬁc a n c ef o rt h et i m ep e r i o dc o e ﬃcient.
T h et i m ep e r i o dc o e ﬃcient’s negative sign indicates that individual rejection rate decreases over
time. Model VI preserves the signiﬁcance and sign for both the oﬀer size and the time period
coeﬃcients, but shows the no signiﬁcance for the treatment coeﬃcients. A χ2 test result indicates
that the null hypothesis of βur = βua = βm = 0 cannot be rejected for a p =0 .229, favoring
the restricted Model V. Figure 1 shows the expected group rejection probabilities based on the
individual rejection response, P(x), from Model V (Table 4).19
In Table 5, Model IV shows signiﬁcance of the treatment coeﬃcients at group level including the
signs characterization. The positive sign of the unanimity with rejection default coeﬃcient (βur > 0)
indicates that rejection probability is higher when a responder group has to decide according to
this voting rule. On the opposite side, the negative sign of the unanimity with acceptance default
coeﬃcient (βua < 0) indicates that rejection probability is lower when a responder group has to
decide according to this voting rule. Finally, the majority rule coeﬃcient (βm) is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. At this level of analysis, Model IV χ2 test result indicates that the null
hypothesis of βurd = βuad = βmr = 0 can be rejected for a p<0.001, favoring this model with
respect to the restricted Model III. Finally, Models V and VI show no signiﬁcance for time period
(p =0 .074). Figure 2 shows the estimated group rejection probabilities from Model IV (Table 5)
and the actual rejection rates for diﬀerent oﬀer intervals.
Summing up our results, the rejection probability estimations using the data set from all ten
periods show how diﬀerent voting rules aﬀect individual and group responses in the ultimatum
bargaining. On one hand, individuals tend to respond in the same way whether they are deciding
within a group or alone. On the other hand, diﬀerent voting rules aﬀect group rejection probabilities
as expected. Smaller oﬀers result in higher rejection probability. Finally, time is important to
explain changes on individual rejection probability over time. In particular, equivalent oﬀers are
less likely to be rejected over time. Figure 3 shows a comparison between the expected group
This speciﬁcation takes into account for majority rule the possibility of higher rejection rates at lower oﬀers
a n dl o w e rr e j e c t i o nr a t e sf o rh i g h e ro ﬀers (βm > 0a n dβom < 0). We could not reject the null hypothesis that
βom = βm =0f o rap<0.5, indicating that a restricted model does a better performance in explaining rejection
probability.
19The value for time period was 5.
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Figure 1: Expected Group Rejection Probabilities based on Individual Response Estimation from
Model V (Table 4)
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Figure 2: Estimated Group Rejection Probabilities from Model IV (Table 5) and the Actual Re-
jection Rates
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Figure 3: Expected Group Response vs. Estimated Group Response
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Unanimity with Acceptance Defau
Figure 4: Amount Oﬀers
response and the estimated group response for each treatment. We conclude that our comparative
static predictions for the rejection probabilities seem to hold at least in qualitative terms.
4.2 Proposer Behavior
Given the diﬀerences in group rejection probabilities for diﬀerent voting rules, we should expect
changes in oﬀers across treatments. Figure 3 shows, for each treatment, the ﬁnal oﬀer average and
all oﬀers average (+/- 2 standard errors) across all ten periods. We consider the following four
main speciﬁcation for estimating the oﬀer size diﬀerences across all treatments for the all periods:
Offeri = α0 (7)
Offeri = α0 + βperiodPeriod (8)
28Table 6: Proposer Behavior
All Periods
Coeﬃcients Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X
Intercept 38.3364... 40.0200... 38.7636... 38.8293...
Period -0.3061... -0.3061... -0.3181...
URejection 7.0667... 5.3307...
UAcceptance -0.8100 2.3529
(p = 0.735) (p = 0.372)
Majority -1.9800 -3.9813
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.: p<0.05, ..: p<0.01 and ...: p<0.001.
29Offeri = α0 + αurURejection + αuaUAcceptance+ αmMajority+ βperiodPeriod (9)
Offeri = α0 + αurURejection + αuaUAcceptance+ αmMajority+ βperiodPeriod (10)
+Period∗ (βpurURejection + βpuaUAcceptance + βpmMajority)
where Offeri is the oﬀer proposer i sent from 0 to 100; Periodis the period time in which an oﬀer
was made; and URejection, UAcceptance and Majority are dummies for each of the voting rules.
We use for these estimations all the oﬀers made. We again exclude the oﬀers made by the same
subjects mentioned before for the one-on-one and group-on-group majority rule. Table 6 shows the
random eﬀect estimations for these speciﬁcations.
Model VII is just the oﬀers’ average for the whole data. Model IX checks whether diﬀerent
voting rules aﬀect individual proposals in addition to time period considered in Model VIII. We
should expect the oﬀer size coeﬃcient for unanimity with rejection default be greater than zero
(αur > 0), meaning that compared to the one-on-one treatment proposers should be willing to oﬀer
more given the high rejection probability behind by this voting rule. For unanimity with acceptance
default, we should expect a coeﬃcient less than zero (αua < 0), which means that compared to the
one-on-one treatment proposers should be willing to oﬀer less given the low probability of rejection.
Compared to the one-on-one treatment, proposers in majority rule should be willing to oﬀer less
when P(x) < 1
4 and more otherwise. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to clearly specify in advanced the
coeﬃcient sign associated to this treatment. Model X allows the possibility of a diﬀerent dynamic
within each treatment.
Model VII shows that the time period coeﬃcient (βperiod)i ss i g n i ﬁcant for a p<0.001. This
means that proposers were willing to oﬀer less overtime. Model IX shows ﬁrst that the unanimity
with rejection default coeﬃcient is diﬀerent from zero (p<0.001), indicating that proposers tend to
oﬀer more than in the one-on-one treatment. On the other hand, the other two treatment coeﬃcients
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The majority rule and unanimity with acceptance default
coeﬃcient are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for a p =0 .429 and p =0 .735, respectively.
However, a χ2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of βur = βua = βm = 0 can be rejected
for a p<0.001. Model VIII and IX assume that the dynamic within each treatment is the same.
Model X removes this restriction introducing a time period interaction for each treatment. Model
X χ2 test result indicates that the null hypothesis of βpur = βpua = βpm = 0 can be rejected for a
p<0.001. Therefore, the introduction of this interaction of time period and treatments contribute
30to the explanation of the oﬀers. In particular, Model IV shows that proposals tend to decrease
over time faster in the group-on-group unanimity with acceptance default than in the one-on-one
treatment. It also shows that proposal tend to increase over time faster in the group-on-group
majority rule than in the one-on-one treatment.
Summing up our results, our estimations indicate that oﬀers decrease over time; oﬀers are
higher for the unanimity with rejection default than for other treatments; oﬀers are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent for the other two voting rules compared to the control treatment; and while oﬀers decrease
over time in the unanimity with acceptance default, they increase in the majority rule.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we provide a comparison between four diﬀerent treatments of ultimatum bargaining:
the one-on-one bargaining and three diﬀerent group-on-group games diﬀerentiated by the controlled
decision rule used on the responder side to agree on acceptance or rejection. At present, the results
of our experiments seem to support the following conclusions:
We cannot reject the hypothesis that individual responder behavior is the same in all four
treatments. The willingness to reject low oﬀers clearly suggests existence of a non-monetary com-
ponent in individual payoﬀs. The absence of diﬀerence between the behavior inside and outside
the group suggests that this behavior could be fully explained by assuming that agents care about
the distribution of monetary payoﬀs among the bargainers (in particular, by their dislike of being
treated unfairly). We do not get any evidence of either preference for expressing displeasure and
or satisfaction through one’s vote, nor of some common non-monetary value (such as would arise
if agents cared about behaving according to some social norm): both of these would have clear
predictions on the comparative statics of responder behavior across treatments.
We can reject hypothesis that the proposer behavior is the same in all four treatments. In
particular, in the unanimity with rejection default proposers are clearly substantially more cautious
than in other treatments, which indicates that they correctly respond to the increased diﬃculty of
obtaining acceptance of their proposals. We, so far, cannot reject that proposers behave identically
in the other three treatments. In particular, we fail to reproduce the Grosskopf [9] result that in
the unanimity with acceptance default treatment proposers would be more aggressive. One reason
for this may be that, though, as discussed above, the diﬀerence in responder behavior between
31the treatments is not statistically signiﬁcant, the realization of the individual conditional rejection
probability in this treatment happened to be somewhat high, possibly “training” the agents to
behave somewhat more cautiously. This is supported by the fact that in Grosskopf’s [9], though
similarly not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the one-on-one case, the realization of group rejection
probability is low, possibly reinforcing her results.
It is suggested by the previous discussion that proposers may be best-responding to empirical
rejection probabilities they face. Furthermore, there does seem to be evidence that agents learn
the “correct” behavior over time. Further research is needed to establish exactly the nature of this
learning process and how it responds to the empirical rejection.
A number of things remain to be done. Most obviously, more sessions will have to be run to
collect the data, since our statistical inference does suﬀer from low numbers of observations (in each
round we observe only 9 to 10 plays of each group treatment). Furthermore, it may be interesting
to let the same subjects participate in diﬀerent experimental treatments (in particular, this may
help us test the majority rule predictions, since these depend on individual aggressiveness of the
proposers). Finally, since the results clearly support importance of agents’ learning in ultimatum
bargaining games, future research would have to address the relationship between our results and
the literature on learning in games.
326 Appendix 1: Experimental Instructions
The following is the verbatim translation (from Spanish into English) of experimental instructions adminis-
tered to subjects at ITAM (the Spanish original is available from the authors upon request).
6.1 Instructions Group-on-Group
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully
and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID
YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a member of a GROUP A or a GROUP B. Your participation
as a part of one of these two groups shall be determined at the beginning of the experiment and will be
constant during the entire session. Each group shall consist solely of three (3) participants.
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and 10 periods played for money, one
of which shall be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine your ﬁnal pay. For this reason
you should consider each period as if it were “the chosen period” for your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A GROUP will interact with a TYPE B GROUP. The
formation of pairs of GROUPS A and B will be done randomly. Likewise, the membership composition of
each group will change in a random fashion, so that each participant will form a part of a new GROUP (of
t h es a m et y p e )a tt h eb e g i n n i n go fe a c hp e r i o d .
Speciﬁc Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of groups is to try to divide 100 points using the following rules.
1) The members of GROUP A must make an oﬀer of points to members of GROUP B.
1.1) To make the ﬁnal oﬀer from GROUP A to GROUP B each member of GROUP A must write and
send an oﬀer via the computer. Each oﬀer must be in the range of 0 to 100 points.
1.2) After that, one of these oﬀers made shall be chosen randomly by the computer as the ﬁnal oﬀer of
GROUP A to GROUP B.
2) The ﬁnal oﬀer of GROUP A shall be sent to each member of GROUP B. After observing the oﬀer
sent, the members of GROUP B must decide if they accept of reject the oﬀer according to the following rule:
The oﬀer is considered accepted when every one of the members of the group votes to accept it. Otherwise
it is considered rejected.20
2.1) If GROUP B rejects the oﬀer, no GROUP receives any pay.
2.2) If GROUP B accepts the oﬀer, the GROUP A receives the amount of 100 points minus the points
oﬀered to GROUP B. In its turn, GROUP B receives the amount of points which has been oﬀered by GROUP
A.
3) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the oﬀer of points is ﬁnal, no counter-oﬀer shall be
possible, and the next period shall start with a new grouping of participants for each group type.
Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen randomly to determine the
ﬁnal pay. For this reason, you should consider each period as if it were ﬁnal “chosen period” for your pay.
20This corresponds to Unanimity with rejection default; instructions for other treatments are as follows.
Unanimity with acceptance default:
“The oﬀer is considered rejected when every one of the members of the group votes to accept it. Otherwise
it is considered accepted”.
Majority rule:
“The oﬀer is considered accepted when at least two of the members of the group vote to accept it. Otherwise
it is considered rejected.”
33The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each member of each group shall get $2.6
pesos for each point obtained by the group to which she\he belongs, in addition to the basic amount of $20
pesos for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the identiﬁcation number assigned
by the computer at the beginning of the experiment to receive his/her pay in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring
the complete anonymity of his/her decisions and their results.
6.2 Instructions One-on-One
This is an experiment about decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully
and take good decisions, you can earn a CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MONEY, which will be PAID
YOU IN CASH at the end of the experiment
General Proceedings
In this experiment you will participate as a TYPE A or TYPE B AGENT. Your participation as one of
these agent types shall be determined at the beginning of the experiment and will be constant during the
entire session
The experiment shall consist of 12 periods: two practice periods, and 10 periods played for money, one
of which shall be randomly selected at the end of the experiment to determine your ﬁnal pay. For this reason
you should consider each period as if it were “the chosen period” for your pay.
At the beginning of each period, each TYPE A AGENT will interact with a TYPE B AGENT. The
formation of pairs of TYPE A and TYPE B AGENTS will be done randomly.
Speciﬁc Proceedings
In each period the task of each pair of agents is to try to divide 100 points using the following rules.
1) Each TYPE A AGENT must make an oﬀer of points to a TYPE B AGENT. For this each TYPE A
A G E N Tm u s tw r i t ea n ds e n da no ﬀer via the computer. Each oﬀer must be in the range of 0 to 100 points.
2) After observing the oﬀer sent by the TYPE A AGENT, the TYPE B AGENT must decide if she\he
accepts or rejects it.
2.1) If the TYPE B AGENT rejects the oﬀer, no AGENT receives any pay.
2.2) If TYPE B AGENT accepts the oﬀer, the TYPE A AGENT receives the amount of 100 points
minus the points oﬀered to TYPE B AGENT. In its turn, TYPE B AGENT receives the amount of points
which has been oﬀered by TYPE A AGENT.
3) Once taken, the decision to accept or reject the oﬀer of points is ﬁnal, no counter-oﬀer shall be
possible, and the next period shall start with a new grouping of agent pairs.
- Payment Proceedings
Once the 10 periods played for money are over, one of them will be chosen randomly to determine the
ﬁnal pay. For this reason you should consider each period as if it were ﬁnal “chosen period” for your pay.
The pay for the chosen period shall be calculated as follows: Each agent shall get $2.6 pesos for each
point obtained, in addition to the basic amount of $20 pesos for participation.
At the end of the session, each of the participants shall be called by the identiﬁcation number assigned
by the computer at the beginning of the experiment to receive his/her pay in a sealed envelope, thus ensuring
the complete anonymity of his/her decisions and their results.
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